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Guidelines for different qualitative research genres 
have been proposed in information systems (IS). As these 
guidelines are outlined for conducting and evaluating 
good research, studies may be denied publication simply 
because they do not follow a prescribed methodology. 
This can result in “checkbox” compliance, where the 
guidelines become more important than the study. We 
argue that guidelines can only be used to evaluate what 
good research is if there is evidence that they lead to 
certain good research outcomes. Currently, the 
guidelines do not present such evidence. Instead, when it 
is presented, the evidence is often an authority argument 
or evidence of popularity with usability examples. We 
further postulate that such evidence linking guidelines 
and outcomes cannot be presented. Therefore, it may be 
time for the IS research community to acknowledge that 
many research method principles we regard as 
authoritative may ultimately be based on speculation and 
opinion, and thus, they should be taken less seriously as 
absolute guidelines in the review process. 
1. Introduction 
In the information systems (IS) field, there is a 
perception that only positivistic research methods are 
“legitimate methods for use in social science” [1 p. 343]. 
Such positivistic methods include “inferential statistics, 
hypothesis testing, mathematical analyses, and 
experimental and quasi-experimental design” [1 p. 343]. 
Although such views may not be truly positivistic [2], it 
is understandable that scholars engaged in qualitative IS 
research report significant difficulty in meeting these 
beliefs in publishing qualitative research. Many 
qualitative IS scholars reacted to these perceptions by 
writing methodological articles aimed at rendering 
qualitative research “scientific” or publishable [3, 4]. For 
example, Lee [5] proposed a case study methodology to 
meet the standards of the “positivistic” natural science 
model of scientific research. Klein and Myers [6] 
reported that, “while the conventions for evaluating 
information systems case studies conducted according to 
the natural science model of social science are now 
widely accepted, this is not the case for interpretive field 
studies” [p. 67]. To ensure IS acceptance of interpretive 
research, these authors proposed principles for 
conducting and evaluating interpretive research.  
A similar trend has occurred for conducting and 
evaluating design-science research [7]. Later, similar 
guidelines were outlined for mixed-methods research by 
Venkatesh: “there is a dearth of mixed methods research 
in information systems” [8 p. 1] and a lack of “guidelines 
for conducting and evaluating mixed methods 
[research].” To increase publication of mixed-methods 
research, these authors proposed guidelines for 
conducting mixed-methods research in IS studies. 
We do not doubt that the guidelines described above 
have helped IS scholars in publishing qualitative, mixed-
methods, and design-science research. The downside is 
that the guidelines can also prevent the publication of 
such research, as reviewers can interpret them as absolute 
dogma regulating what is acceptable (rigorous) and what 
is not acceptable IS research. The guidelines can be 
easily read in this way. For example, it is noted that 
“guidelines should be addressed in some manner for 
design-science research to be complete” [7 p. 82]. To 
give another example, Venkatesh et al. [8] provided a 
normative view that “IS researchers should employ a 
mixed-methods approach only when they intend to 
provide a holistic understanding of a phenomenon for 
which extant research is fragmented, inconclusive, and 
equivocal” [p. 36]. This implies that, in other situations, 
mixed methods should not be used.  
Given that the guidelines can be interpreted as 
normative, it is currently the case that IS scholars 
“produce knowledge that seeks to get through reviewers 
looking to check boxes on theory and method” [9 p. 275]. 
Fitzgerald [10] reported that, during the doctoral 
consortium of the International Conference on Software 
Engineering, “research method was mentioned just once 
(and that was by a student) and the focus was much more 
on the actual content of the research.” He stated that, 
when he attended the doctoral consortium of the 
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 
“more than 50% of the time involved discussions of 
research method issues. However, I do not necessarily 
think that this was time well-spent.”  
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In the IS field, the perception that it is important to 
adhere to correct research method principles (RMPs) as 
a hallmark of science is understandable. Influential 
scientific thinkers, such as Comte, Bain, Jevons, 
Helmholtz, and Mach, thought that the scientific method 
is necessary for the success of science [11]. Logical 
positivists even suggested that the use of a scientific 
method distinguishes science from pseudoscience [12]. 
However, numerous philosophers, such as Feyerabend 
[13], have reported that strict methodological principles 
restrict innovation, thereby hindering scientific 
breakthroughs. 
This study reviews some of the research method 
guidelines (RMGs) in IS. We also review the philosophy 
of science regarding RMGs. We end by presenting a 
naturalistic approach to RMGs in IS, in which RMGs are 
regarded as either scientific hypotheses with evidence or 
idealizations. The first approach requires evidence that 
each principle leads to a specific outcome. We maintain 
that such evidence cannot be provided in indeterministic 
settings, such as in IS (qualitative) research. As a result, 
we postulate that RMGs are idealized and may have 
various benefits for educational purposes. Having said 
that, it is debatable whether they can be used to evaluate 
the quality of research. 
2. Methodological guidelines for 
qualitative-oriented IS research  
We first explain RMGs and RMPs, and then we 
review three guidelines for research in IS. We point out 
that these guidelines are outlined as criteria for good or 
high-quality research. Finally, we review what evidence 
they provide to back up their claim that they can be used 
as guidelines on how to conduct and evaluate research.  
2.1. RMGs and RMPs 
 
In the philosophy of science, RMPs and RMGs 
belong to the “theory of scientific methodology” [14 p. 
3], which we review in section 3. There is no common 
definition for RMPs and RMGs in the philosophy of 
science. Roughly speaking, RMPs are concerned with 
“how scientific theories in general are appraised and 
validated” [14 p. 3]. What can be regarded as RMPs 
varies from one author to another in the philosophy of 
science. We characterize RMPs as any principles that 
provide normative guidance on how good research is 
conducted or evaluated (or both).  
In IS, RMPs can vary from requiring certain tests, p-
values, and sample sizes to requiring normative 
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 Venkatesh et al. [8] also “offer a set of guidelines for IS researchers 
to consider in making decisions regarding whether to employ a mixed 
methods approach in their research” [p. 15]. 
statements about which conditions of qualitative research 
are acceptable for mixed-methods studies. An RMG 
consists of one or more RMPs; thus, broadly speaking, 
an RMG is a collection of RMPs. For example, Klein and 
Myers [6] suggested nine principles for interpretive 
research; each of these principles is an RMP, according 
to our terminology, while the complete list of principles 
is regarded as an RMG. 
2.2. Guidelines for conducting and evaluating 
high-quality, rigorous research 
 
Considering that the IS literature is prolific when it 
comes to research methodology guidelines, in this 
section, we focus primarily on three commonly known 
and widely cited normative criteria. These are Klein and 
Myers’s [6] criteria for interpretive field studies, Hevner 
et al.’s [7] criteria for design science, and Venkatesh et 
al.’s [8] criteria for mixed research. We discuss these 
guidelines below. 
Hevner et al. [7] conducted a study “to inform the 
community of IS researchers and practitioners of how to 
conduct, evaluate, and present design-science research 
… by developing a set of guidelines for conducting and 
evaluating good design-science research” [p. 77]. Hevner 
[15] also reported that “it is vital that we as a research 
community provide clear and consistent guidelines for 
the design and execution of high quality design science 
research projects” [p. 87]. Similarly, Klein and Myers [6] 
noted that “[a]s the interest in interpretive research has 
increased … researchers, reviewers, and editors have 
raised questions about how interpretive field research 
should be conducted and how its quality can be assessed” 
[p. 67]. Mixed method guidelines have similar goals. For 
instance, Venkatesh et al. [8] offered “a set of guidelines 
for conducting and evaluating mixed methods research 
in IS … to initiate and facilitate discourse on mixed 
methods research in IS and encourage and assist IS 
researchers to conduct rigorous mixed methods research” 
[p. 2]1. 
Grounded theory guidelines [16] are “guidelines for 
conducting and evaluating grounded theory studies in 
information systems” [p. 358], and they should “clarify 
what good grounded theory might look like” [16 p. 368]. 
These guidelines “address how the researcher might 
achieve the degree of conceptualization necessary to 
build a good theory” [16 p. 368].  
To summarize, given the guidelines’ statements, it is 
easy to understand that, in the hands of reviewers, when 
IS research does not meet these guidelines, the 
research—rather than the guidelines—is often blamed as 
being of low quality. When the guidelines are not met, 
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the jargon used by reviewers, for example, may include 
the criticism of a “lack of methodological rigor.” 
Furthermore, considering that these guidelines are 
advocated as procedures for evaluating and conducting 
good or high-quality (qualitative, interpretive, or design-
science) research, we need to ask what evidence they are 
based on. This is considered in the next subsection. 
2.3. Evidence supporting the use of guidelines 
 
Typically, RMG articles require a legitimization 
strategy, which usually involves arguing that the 
proposed guidelines have the following characteristics: 
1) they are consistent with previous research(ers); 2) 
popular among a group of researchers; 3) used by one or 
more published paper(s); and/or 4) can be used by future 
researchers. However, these RMG articles fail to 
mention that the guidelines do not provide evidence for 
better outcomes or performance compared with 
approaches that do not follow the guidelines. Below, we 
discuss these issues in more detail. 
 
2.3.1 Consistency is not evidence of outcomes. Many 
guidelines use the rhetoric of being consistent with some 
articles or researchers. For example, Klein and Myers [6] 
justify their guidelines as follows: the “proposed 
principles are consistent with a considerable part of the 
philosophical base of literature on interpretivism and 
hence an improvement over the status quo” [p. 68]. 
(However, they do not show concretely that their 
principles “are consistent with a considerable part of the 
philosophical base of literature on interpretivism.”) 
Readers should understand that showing consistency 
is not good practice for scientific justification. Consider 
the following well-known thesis: The earth is flat. Then, 
consider the following argument: The earth is flat 
because this view is consistent with Carpenter [17]. 
(William Carpenter [17] advocated the theory that the 
Earth is flat.) It is true that this argument is consistent 
with Carpenter [17]; however, who would accept this as 
evidence that the Earth is flat? 
In scientific research, it is not a good justification 
practice for researchers to base their arguments on 
references that are merely consistent with their opinions. 
This is because justifying claims by stating consistency 
with a previous study does not require the presentation 
of evidence for or against the claim. By analogy, 
proposing a principle for conducting and evaluating 
high-quality research, be it qualitative, mixed method, or 
design science, should require the presentation of 
available evidence for and against each principle. We 
                                               
2 Klein and Myers [6] used “three published examples of interpretive 
field research from the IS research literature … in order to demonstrate 
how authors, reviewers, and editors can apply the principles” [p. 79]. 
argue that scientific research should provide the evidence 
for and against something. This should not be replaced 
by someone’s opinion (without evidence) and references 
that are consistent with these opinions. 
 
2.3.2 Evidence of use or usability. As exemplified by 
[6], [7], and [8], RMGs commonly present examples 
demonstrating the applicability of guidelines 2  by 
providing evidence supporting their use. However, 
evidence for use should not be confused with the quality 
of research or demonstrating cause and effect. We 
illustrate this in the examples below.  
It was once thought that cancer was contagious 
(contagious cancer theory), spreading from one 
individual to another. The practical implication 
(preventive treatment) of the contagious cancer theory 
was that patients should be isolated to avoid the spread 
of the cancer. Let us presume that one follows this 
practice, that is, isolates the patients. This procedure—
the act of isolating the patient successfully—does not 
mean that isolating patients with cancer is proof that 
cancer is contagious. To give an even simpler and more 
provocative example, let us presume that one is 
diagnosed with cancer, and the treatment advice is to 
walk one mile every day. If one can do that, it 
demonstrates that the actions are doable (for this person 
at least); however, the fact that one is able to walk for 
one mile is not evidence that this is a good cancer 
treatment. Similarly, how many times the paper is cited 
should not be conflated with evidence of the outcome. 
The popularity of a claim is not evidence that the claim 
is true.  
The takeaway point is that many IS RMGs—at least 
those reviewed here, namely [6], [7], and [8]—either 
provide some evidence that an RMP has been used or 
demonstrate how an RMP can be used. These measures 
can be useful for pedagogical purposes, but they are not 
evidence on cause and effect or good outcomes. Such 
information cannot be used to claim that these guidelines 
are appropriate for evaluating and conducting good or 
high-quality (interpretive, mixed-method, or design-
science) research. 
 
2.3.3 Contradictory statements create confusion. 
Readers of the guidelines may find some statements 
confusing. For example, on the one hand, Hevner et al. 
[7] “advised against mandatory or rote use of the 
guidelines” [p. 82]. On the other, they suggested that 
“[r]esearchers, reviewers, and editors must use their 
creative skills and judgment to determine when, where, 
and how to apply each of the guidelines in a specific 
Hevner et al. [7] also used three examples: “we use the proposed 
guidelines to assess recent exemplar papers published in the IS 
literature in order to illustrate how authors, reviewers, and editors can 
apply them consistently” [p. 78]. 
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research project” [ibid, p. 82]. Similarly, Klein and 
Myers [6] cautioned that “principles are not like 
bureaucratic rules of conduct, because the application of 
one or more of them still requires considerable creative 
thought … [I]t is incumbent upon authors, reviewers, and 
editors to exercise their judgment and discretion in 
deciding whether, how, and which of the principles 
should be applied and appropriated in any given research 
project” [p. 71]. While this indicates some flexibility in 
guideline application, these researchers also noted that, 
“while we believe that none of our principles should be 
left out arbitrarily, researchers need to work out 
themselves how (and which of) the principles apply in 
any particular situation” [p. 78]. Omitting principles is an 
arbitrary action if no guidelines are provided. In addition, 
Klein and Myers [6] reported a set of guidelines for how 
“interpretive field research should be conducted and how 
its quality can be assessed” [p. 67] that “require 
considerable creative thought” [p. 78] and application 
based on individual perceptions of individual cases. 
However, this raises the following question: If their 
application requires considerable creative thought case 
by case, then how can these principles provide guidelines 
for how research “should be conducted and how its 
quality can be assessed” [p. 67]? 
To summarize, the guideline proposals create 
confusion in several ways. First, if principles require 
situational adaptations, but no guidelines are provided to 
make such adaptions, then the principles cannot help 
provide adequate evaluations of qualitative studies. 
Principles lose value for research evaluation when 
situational adaptations based on personal judgment are 
required. For instance, Klein and Myers’s [6] suggestion 
that principles should “leave open the possibility that 
other authors may suggest additional sets of principles” 
[p. 68] seems to oppose the evaluation of the qualitative 
research’s quality. Second, if principles “require 
considerable creative thought” and case-by-case 
consideration, then how can they be used to determine 
research quality? Before we present our view on the role 
of these guidelines in providing norms for conducting 
and evaluating research, we briefly review what 
philosophy of science has to say about RMPs.  
3. Philosophical foundations for research 
methods 
This section reviews the philosophy of science 
underlying RMPs.  
3.1. The necessity of an absolute research 
method 
 
In this section, selected attempts to build an absolute 
research method are presented, and the perspectives that 
have inspired arguments against logical positivists are 
discussed to show how building an absolute 
methodology for scientific research has failed. Some 
objections have come from logical positivists themselves 
(i.e., Carnap and Neurath) [2]; however, the most well-
known objections have been provided by outsiders, 
including Quine’s [18] dogma of reductionism, Kuhn’s 
[19] methodological subjectivity, and various theses by 
Hanson [20], and Feyerabend [13]; see [2]. 
 
3.1.1. Aristotle: Critical thinking leads to absolute 
certainty. Aristotle considered that scientific knowledge 
can be separated from opinion and superstition with 
absolute certainty through critical thinking [11]. For 
Aristotle, scientific knowledge was absolute and 
infallible [21]. However, later scientific progress cast 
serious doubts on this view [22, 23], as new scientific 
theories and studies kept challenging existing scientific 
views once regarded as infallible or self-evident [23, 14].  
 
3.1.2. Comte, Jevons, Helmholtz, and Mach: Can the 
scientific method explain the success of science? When 
philosophers realized that scientific knowledge cannot be 
certain, specific sciences, such as physics, were 
seemingly highly progressive [11]. This raises the 
question of why they were successful. Given that 
Aristotelian infallible critical thinking was not the 
scientific method explaining the success of science, 
philosophers like Comte, Jevons, Helmholtz, and Mach 
suggested other candidates for the scientific method [11]. 
However, they could not agree on what this scientific 
method was [11]. Even more problematic was that 
Duhem [24] showed that proposed RMPs were either not 
used or were violated by successful scientists. As science 
continued to make breakthroughs in physics and 
medicine, interest in understanding this success was high 
[11]. Motivated in this way, logical positivists (e.g., 
Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap) suggested that the 
scientific method not only explains the success of 
science, but it can also be used to differentiate science 
from pseudoscience [2]. For example, Schlick [12] put 
forward an absolute method known as the verification 
method. Logical positivists’ ambition to establish an 
absolute and objective method to separate science from 
nonsense attracted a lot of criticism, which ultimately 
clarified that no method is truly objective. Such criticism 
is discussed below.  
 
3.1.3. Insider critique of logical positivism: Neurath 
and Carnap. Criticism of absolute RMPs first emerged 
in the Vienna Circle. Neurath, and later Carnap, argued 
that absolute RMPs were impossible [25], and Carnap 
[26] noted that no methodological norm provided 
“objective validity” because norms cannot “be 
empirically verified or deduced from empirical 
propositions; indeed [norms] cannot be affirmed at all” 
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[p. 237]. In other words, Carnap deemed the acceptance 
of any RMP a matter of taste. This does not mean that 
Carnap lacked RMP preferences, as he certainly had 
them. Rather, it signifies that Carnap viewed it as 
impossible to justify that one RMP is ultimately better 
than another [27]. Therefore, for Carnap, RMPs were 
“proposals, which no one was obligated to accept” [28]. 
Similarly, logical empiricist Reichenbach [29] noted that 
the aims of science, including the choice of 
methodological norms, are ultimately a matter of taste. 
3.2. The relativistic critique: Quine, Kuhn, 
Hanson, and Feyerabend 
 
The critique outside the logical positivism was better 
known than the logical positivists own critique was. 
However, this outsiders’ critique was not fatal to the 
logical positivism, because positivists had already left 
their views behind [27, 30]. Ironically, while the 
positivists’ mission of developing an absolute 
methodology failed, it also inspired a number of 
philosophers to show how the best science was 
ultimately based on speculative metaphysics [2]. These 
views aimed to illustrate the following: 1) no method 
could be absolutely objective [18, 20]; 2) acceptance of 
RMPs was irrational, subjective, and a matter of fate 
similar to acceptance of religious views [19]; 3) RMPs 
were worse than useless [13]; and 4) RMPs were tacit 
knowledge that was impossible to present as written 
principles [31].  
 
3.2.1. Quine: Verification theory and reductionism. 
Quine’s [18] critique pointed out that verification cannot 
test a single statement or hypothesis isolated from its 
underlying assumptions. That is to say, any test or 
observation, no matter how simple and obvious it may 
sound, is always associated with a number of underlying 
presuppositions that are not empirically testable and 
must be assumed. Quine [18] maintained that, when a 
claim is tested, a complex web of assumptions and 
presuppositions are also tested; thus, he concluded that 
any hypothesis can be accepted by revising the 
underlying assumptions. Quine’s critique applies to any 
test for RMPs. 
 
3.2.2. Kuhn: Fundamental method decisions are 
irrational. Kuhn [19] argued against positivists’ 
absolute views. Kuhn argued that different paradigms in 
one scientific discipline have radically different 
methodological norms for assessing theories. These 
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 Feyerabend [34] noted: “anything goes does not express any 
conviction of mine, it is jocular summary of the predicament of the 
rationalist: if you want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live 
without principles that hold independently of situation, shape of world, 
norms are subjective beliefs rather than evidence-based 
assertions [19]. Kuhn [19] maintained that, by definition, 
the worldview and languages of each paradigm are so 
different that one paradigm cannot communicate 
methodological rules outside of it. Kuhn claimed that a 
change in methodological thinking in physics does not 
occur through rational discussions or objective evidence, 
and it has nothing to do with the verification method 
suggested by positivists [12]. Instead, methodological 
changes for assessing theories are irrational, a “leap of 
faith,” or comparable to a religious “conversion 
experience” [12]. 
 
3.2.3. Hanson: Theory-laden observations. The 
positivists’ verification method was based on 
observation [2]. Hanson [20] took up this point and 
argued that all observations are theory laden. For 
example, when microscopic images from a biochemistry 
journal are viewed, those who have doctorates in 
biochemistry see different things in the picture than those 
who lack such education [2]. Hanson [20] presented 
examples of how, even within one scientific discipline, 
different scientists may see different things based on the 
same observational evidence available.  
 
3.2.4 Feyerabend: Universal method principles are 
worse than useless. Feyerabend [32] examined 
breakthroughs in physics. He argued that there are no 
universal, predefined, or common methodological rules 
in science. He argued that if he had to give one such rule, 
it would be “anything goes”; this became his famous 
slogan [33], [34]3. See also Treiblmaier [35]. Feyerabend 
[13] presented evidence that the best scientists made up 
their own RMPs as they proceeded with their research. 
Importantly, Feyerabend [13] noted that breaking the 
rules for appraising research was not limited to 
exceptional cases. Instead, he emphasized that the 
scientific elite not only broke all the common and 
predefined RMPs, but they also did so frequently [13, p. 
23]. Feyerabend’s [13] other important point was that 
RMPs restrict theory development: “Science needs 
people who are adaptable and inventive, not rigid 
imitators of established behavioral patterns” [13, p. 163]. 
For him, theory development was an invention that 
“depends on our talents and other fortuities 
circumstances” [13, p. 155], and rules just limit talented 
people [13, p. 156]. Moreover, Feyerabend [13] noted 
that any test or instrument for observation comprises 
(speculative) beliefs that are inculcated in us through 
education and upbringing.  
exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, ties, then I can 
give you such a principle. It will be empty, useless, and pretty 
ridiculous-but it will be a "principle." It will be the "principle" 
"anything goes” [p. 188]. 
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 3.2.5. Polanyi and Hesse: Scientific expertise is tacit 
and cannot be written as methodological rules. 
Polanyi [36] claimed that “[n]o rules can account for the 
way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry, and there 
are no firm rules either for the verification or the 
refutation of the proposed solution of a problem” [p. 27]. 
For Polanyi, scientific activities are intuitive insights and 
tacit knowledge, which cannot be written as rules. 
Somewhat similarly, Hesse [37] noted the impossibility 
of setting rules for science. He maintained that, whenever 
such rules exist, they reflect individuals’ scientific 
upbringing. 
4. RMPs as hypothetical, instrumental, and 
revisable  
Despite the drawbacks mentioned above, logical 
positivists’ lack of ability to establish absolute normative 
rules does not mean that all methodological rules are 
opinion-based or that RMPs are irrational [28]. Rather, 
Laudan [38] suggested that RMPs are like any other 
empirical and conceptual problems in science. 
According to his view, RMPs and RMGs should be as 
open to testing, like any other scientific theory, 
hypothesis, or proposition. In addition, scientific 
theories, hypotheses, and propositions are not “fixed 
once and for all” [p. 353], but instead, may be revisable 
in light of the evidence. Similarly, RMPs and RMGs 
should also be tentative and revisable. Research methods 
are theory laden [20] and subject to Quine’s [18] problem 
of reductionism. This explains why two scholars can 
disagree about a certain RMP even if they are 
considering the same evidence and share the same 
scientific aims.  
If RMPs are hypothetical and revisable in light of 
evidence regarding how effectively they promote the 
goals of science, then the key issue for each RMP is its 
evidence [28]. Different methodological principles can 
be effective for promoting different aims; therefore, each 
RMP is linked to and promotes a specific goal. For 
Laudan [39], selecting a RMP rationally requires 
choosing a method that best promotes a specific goal in 
science. Moreover, for Laudan, an RMP is not chosen in 
a comparative vacuum. Instead, RMPs are selected based 
on a variety of criteria for acceptance, testing, and use, 
by using available evidence [40]. Laudan [38] suggested 
that a decision is rational when an individual perceives 
that certain RMPs are more likely to realize the goals of 
an inquiry than the alternatives are. In the next section, 
we discuss the challenges of applying Laudan’s program 
in IS RMGs for qualitative study, design science and 
mixed methods.   
5. The challenges of Laudan’s normative 
naturalism in IS 
Laudan [41] suggested that the principles of research 
methods are hypothetical imperatives formulated as 
follows: 
“If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently 
promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and 
rival actions, n, [have] failed to do so, then assume 
that future actions follow the rule. If you[r] aim is e, 
you ought to do m[, which is] more likely to promote 
those ends than those actions based on the rule: if 
you[r] aim is e, you ought to do n.” [28] 
Doppelt [42] criticized Laudan, stating that all principles 
of RMGs are hypothetical imperatives. [44] maintained 
that, due to Quine’s underdetermination, there are basic 
methodological standards that are justified, even if they 
lack conclusive empirical evidence for being the most 
effective means of achieving the research aims. If this 
suggestion is accepted, then not all principles of RMGs 
are hypothetical imperatives and some are basic 
methodological standards.  
Laudan [43] and Resnik [44] found this reasoning 
wanting, as do we. Principles of RMGs can be 
underdetermined based on evidence. The implication of 
underdetermination, if accepted, is that researchers can 
challenge that a certain principle, X, is better than Y for 
achieving an outcome; however, this does not challenge 
the idea that RMGs are hypothetical imperatives [43], 
[44]. A practical concern of normative naturalism is that 
scholars cannot survey all the available methods to select 
the one that is best-suited to a specific study; we simply 
lack the cognitive competence for this task [45].  
We see three other concerns in applying Laudan’s 
normative naturalism [43] in IS. First, while the specific 
yet various aims in (say) physics or cancer research may 
be well understood, it is not clear that this is the case in 
IS. We are afraid that the primary “aim” in IS is “how to 
publish in top IS journals,” and the guidelines are 
intended to help with this.  
The second challenge, which is not specific to IS, is 
that the methods may distort the reality. For example, “all 
statistical models include a number of assumptions about 
the underlying data generating process, sampling and the 
observed distributions, that are, strictly speaking, false” 
[46 p. 441]. This means that methods (generally 
speaking) are theoretically restricted. These assumptions 
and restrictions are not understood in IS, perhaps because 
the RMGs in IS are aimed at showing some RMPs as 
accepted. Thus, the aim is not to deeply understand their 
underlying assumptions, which distort the reality. 
However, they need to be understood if we want to use 
them as evidence for promoting certain cognitive goals. 
As a concrete example, statistical significance is not the 
same as practical significance. For example, the 
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American Statistical Association (ASA) announced an 
official warning for authors who employ statistical 
significance tests uncritically: “Statistical significance is 
not equivalent to scientific, human, or economic 
significance” [47]. In medicine [48], “[t]he non-
equivalence of statistical significance and clinical 
importance has long been recognised” [p. 311]. As 
another example, an article [49] noted, “Statistical 
significance at any level does not prove medical, 
scientific, or commercial importance” [p. 325].  
The third issue concerns Laudan’s [39] normative 
naturalism and its implications for cause and effect. This 
issue is also important for any IS guideline, which 
suggests that certain RMPs can be used to evaluate good 
research. For Laudan, “[i]f one’s goal is y, then one ought 
to do x” [p. 24] and “all methodological rules … can be 
re-cast as [a] contingent statement of … [the] 
connections between means and ends” [p. 25]. We argue 
the following: If RMPs are normative, for example, then 
they claim to say what is good qualitative research or 
when mixed methods can be used. This claim implicitly 
assumes cause and outcome (effect) relationships. If 
design-science or interpretive research principles are 
required for doing good science, then there is an assumed 
causal relationship between RMG principles and 
outcomes. Similarly, those reviewers who use the 
guidelines to evaluate what acceptable science is 
implicitly assume cause and outcome (effect) 
relationships, where RMPs are the cause and good or 
acceptable research is the outcome. Are there such causal 
relationships? Is this even possible? To clarify this point, 
let us consider the three following commonly recognized 
causal capacities (or types of causation): 1) deterministic, 
2) random, and 3) probabilistic causation [48 p. 522].  
A deterministic causation “is one which, under 
specifiable circumstances, always produces its effect” 
[ibid]. Deterministic causality requires the existence of 
true, 100% exceptionless laws. In psychological and 
social phenomena, such as qualitative research, there are 
no deterministic laws [50]. It is highly questionable to 
claim that the RMPs are deterministic, that is, that they 
cause the effect, namely the outcome of good research, 
with no exceptions. This leaves us with two options: The 
causation is probabilistic or random. “[P]robabilistic 
capacity also operates only sometimes, but the strength 
of the tendency to produce the effect is nomologically 
fixed … [I]f there are genuinely random capacities, it is 
obvious that there are capacities that cannot be reduced 
to quantitative probabilities” [39 p. 522]. None of these 
guidelines show probabilistic evidence, that for example, 
with 85% likelihood, employing a certain RMP leads to 
better results than following some other principle. This 
is not a criticism of these guidelines: We doubt that 
producing such evidence is possible at all. For example, 
Thagard [51] suggested that causality in medical 
research and psychology is complex, changing, and 
above all, random. What is random causality? “A random 
capacity sometimes produces its effect and sometimes 
does not, but nature does not determine how often or how 
regularly it does so” [39 p. 522]. To summarize, if there 
are no deterministic or probabilistic causes between the 
RMPs and the outcomes because the phenomenon is 
indeterministic, then no philosophizing or tests can 
establish it. This does not imply that the qualitative, 
mixed-methods, or design-science research is 
“unscientific.” Rather, it means that we should omit the 
idea that certain RMPs produce or guarantee (i.e., cause) 
good research. The implication is that the RMPs or 
RMGs should have little normative effect on our journal 
review process. Moreover, this does not mean that they 
are useless; rather, they can have a pedagogical function, 
for example, in PhD training.  
6. Discussion 
Next, we discuss five key problems emanating from 
the “normativization” of methodological guidelines.   
6.1. Clear and consistent guidelines 
 
Hevner [15] noted that “it is vital that we as a research 
community provide clear and consistent … guidelines … 
for the design and execution of high quality design 
science research projects … to establish the credibility of 
IS design science research” [p. 87]. The problem with the 
requirement for consistent guidelines is that it may force 
design-science research into a uniform format that does 
not allow for variety. This was noted by Klein and Myers 
[6]: “[T]he complete literature of interpretive philosophy 
comprises so many varied philosophical positions that it 
is unlikely to yield one consistent set of principles for 
doing interpretive research” [p. 70]. An additional 
concern is the prohibition of creativity and out-of-the-
box thinking, which can hinder scientific innovation.  
 
6.2. Checkbox compliance  
 
Klein and Myers [6] noted, “it is better to have some 
principles than none at all, since the absence of any 
criteria increases the risk that interpretive work will 
continue to be judged inappropriately” [p. 68]. There is 
also a risk that these guidelines will pave the way for 
inappropriate judgements. The idea that, by reading an 
article on a set of principles, readers can conduct and 
evaluate research in the area is misleading and can lead 
to checkbox compliance.  
First, these guidelines may create a situation where 
reviewers, without any hands-on expertise on 
interpretive, design, or mixed-methods research, take on 
the role of gatekeepers by simply using these guidelines 
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as a checklist. Second, if paper acceptance in leading IS 
journals requires compliance with these principles (to 
meet “methodological rigor”), then what is required for 
publication is not gained expertise on qualitative 
research, but instead, how to demonstrate compliance 
with the guidelines. If this is true, then it may lead to a 
situation where the required methodological principle is 
complying with the guidelines and not the mastery of, 
say, interpretive research. Consequently, we may have IS 
scholars whose primary qualitative “training” is reading 
the guidelines, with a focus on strict compliance (to 
maximize paper acceptance). We are afraid that this is 
already the case.  
Finally, what happens to creative and unexpected 
research and any settings or circumstances that do not fit 
the guidelines4? More precisely, there is the risk that 
noncompliance with the guidelines will be viewed as a 
“lack of methodological rigor” or “flaw,” thereby leading 
to rejection. If reviewers’ “challenge is to find the fatal 
flaws” [52], then we are afraid that the bet is to find a 
setting or circumstances where you can have 100% 
compliance with a guideline. It could be that important 
cases and settings are those complex and dynamic cases 
that do not match well with any established guidelines. 
6.3. Do the RMGs meet the standards they 
impose?  
 
As exemplified by [6], [7], and [8], many 
RMGs/RMPs propose “validation” or “evaluation” 
guidelines and ask the authors to validate their research 
with different “rigorous” tests. At the same time, readers 
can hardly find such “rigorous” evidence supporting the 
RMPs in these articles. This makes readers wonder 
whether the RMG articles meet the standards they set for 
empirical research. The answer is that they do not meet 
their principles. For example, Hevner et al. [7] suggest 
comparisons with rival approaches, but they do not 
consider doing this for their guidelines. 
6.4. How should we regard the RMGs and their 
principles? 
 
One option concerning how we should regard the 
RMGs and their principles is in line with Kuhn’s [19] 
suggestion that the decisions about which RMPs are used 
by a research community are irrational, so that a shift in 
such norms is comparable to a religious “conversion 
experience” [19]. As for those who agree with Polanyi 
[31], they would perhaps deny the whole business of 
                                               
4 For example, Venkatesh et al. [8] “summarize seven purposes for 
mixed methods research that [the authors] adapted from prior research” 
[p. 5], indicating that only these seven purposes are possible. Moreover, 
“if researchers fail to provide and explain meta-inferences, the very 
proposing a set of principles (and claim that the research 
method competence is tacit). Laudan’s  [28], [38] 
approach would subject these principles to scientific 
study. According to this view [38], research on 
“methodology is the study of how to conduct inquiry 
effectively” [p. 349]. According to Laudan [39], the key 
question for scholars examining research methodologies 
is understanding that “methodology rules are … 
statements about instrumentalities, about effective means 
for realizing cherished ends” [p. 24]. Given that RMGs 
are like any other theories or set of propositions in 
science, RMPs are testable to the same extent as any 
other theories, hypotheses, and propositions in science 
[38]. However, such tests have not been reported in IS. 
Ultimately, if we cannot show any evidence that these 
principles lead to better outcomes than their competitors, 
then why should we require them?  
6.5. The “authority” and “consistent with” 
arguments 
 
As a final point, many RMGs justify either individual 
principles or the whole RMG with an authority 
argument, such as “in our opinion” or “based on our 
insights.” An authority argument is, for example, when 
one declares an opinion without presenting the available 
evidence to justify it. Readers may wonder whether the 
RMPs, especially when they are used to regulate 
research, are too important to be a matter of authority or 
opinion. If RMGs contain rules that regulate what 
“rigorous” practice is, and reviewers require authors to 
follow them, then should such principles not only be 
testable claims on how the RMPs are empirically 
successful in achieving the specific goals? Instead, 
should they also present evidence for (and against) the 
approach? As elaborated on above, RMGs typically use 
the “consistent with” argument, which is a questionable 
approach to justification.  
7. Conclusion 
Methodological guidelines have been proposed for 
both conducting and evaluating qualitative, design-
science, and mixed-methods research. While these 
guidelines require rigorous testing and validation, they 
themselves do not meet these requirements. The 
“evidence” for the guidelines consists of the authors’ 
opinion and showing that the principle is consistent with 
some previously published research. The guidelines give 
examples on the applicability of the principles, showing 
objective of conducting a mixed methods research study is not 
achieved” [p. 19]. Or consider, “IS researchers should employ a mixed-
methods approach only when they intend to provide a holistic 
understanding of a phenomenon for which extant research is 
fragmented, inconclusive, and equivocal” [p. 36].” 
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how they can be applied or how a study has applied them. 
Neither focus counts as evidence for “conducting” and 
“evaluating” good or high-quality research.  
If the method guidelines are used for evaluation—as 
they claim—then papers’ acceptance should not be based 
on the authority argument, usability, or showing that the 
principle is consistent with some papers. Moreover, there 
is a risk that the guidelines have paved the way for 
‘checkbox’ compliance, where research that meets the 
principles are accepted and research that does not is 
regarded as lacking methodological rigor. Our 
experience suggest that this situation is common.  
It is also important to ask why IS journals need to 
present method guidelines when there are many research 
method journals5? Do the IS guidelines add any value? 
Finally, the philosophy of science regarding the scientific 
method offers important lessons for IS. One option is 
regarding each RMP as a tentative and revisable 
principle that enjoys evidence for and against. This view 
means that RMGs are similar to hypotheses in science 
and have limited generalizability. This option, however, 
seems to be impossible to achieve in the IS context of 
mixed, design-science, and qualitative methods. 
Alternatively, the Kuhnian approach is regarding RMGs 
as dogmatic and irrational conventions. Our proposal is 
considering the guidelines as idealizations, which are 
useful for pedagogical purposes. This does not mean that 
IS guidelines are useless, but rather, that they should 
have less weight in evaluating what is an acceptable use 
of method. 
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